Чжуан-цзы.
Перевод Малявина
Веселье и гнев, печаль и радость, надежды и раскаяние, перемены и
неизменность, благородные замыслы и низкие поступки — как музыка,
исторгаемая из пустоты, как грибы, возникающие из испарений, как день и
ночь, сменяющие друг друга перед нашим взором. И неведомо, откуда все это?
Но да будет так! Не от него ли то, что и днем, и ночью с нами? Как будто бы
есть подлинный господин, но нельзя различить его примет. Деяниям его нельзя
не довериться, но невозможно узреть его образ!
Не будь "другого", не было бы и моего "я" [9], а не будь моего "я", не
было бы необходимости делать выбор. Кажется, тут мы недалеки от истины, но
все еще не знаем, откуда приходят наши мысли.
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Всякое "это" есть также "то", а всякое "то" есть также "это". Там
говорят "так" и "не так", имея свою точку зрения, и здесь говорят "так" и
"не так", тоже имея свою точку зрения. Но существует ли в действительности
"это" и "то", или такого различия вовсе не существует? Там, где "это" и "то"
еще не противостоят друг другу, находится Ось Пути. Постигнув эту ось в
центре мирового круговорота, обретаем способность бесконечных превращений: и
наши "да", и наши "нет" неисчерпаемы. Вот почему сказано: нет ничего лучше,
чем прийти к прозрению.
Вместо того чтобы доказывать, что палец не является пальцем, лучше
сразу сказать, что непалец не является пальцем. Вместо того чтобы
доказывать, что "лошадь не является лошадью", лучше сразу сказать, что
нелошадь не является лошадью. Небо и Земля — один палец, вся тьма вещей —
одна лошадь [14].
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В целом мире нет ничего больше кончика осенней паутинки, а великая гора
Тайшань мала. Никто не прожил больше умершего младенца, а Пэнцзу умер в юном
возрасте. Небо и Земля живут вместе со мной, вся тьма вещей составляет со
мной одно.
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+ а откуда, простите, Гегель мог что-либо знать про наличие или отсутствие китайской логики?
+
http://atschool.eduweb.co.uk/cite/staff/philosopher/chinese.htmChinese Kant-scholarship has long recognized a basic similarity between Kant and the major school of Chinese philosophy, neo-Confucianism. Confucius, along with most of his interpreters down through the centuries, largely ignored the metaphysical and epistemological questions that have generally taken center stage in the West. Instead, Chinese philosophers tend to emphasize the importance of acting on principle (or, according to the rites, called li in Chinese), with the result that most Chinese people value a person's collective duty as a member of society far above one's individual rights as a human being. Western philosophers, in stark contrast, have typically emphasized rights over duties, with both playing second fiddle to questions of reality and knowledge. Whereas Chinese philosophy tends to define personhood in terms of the duties placed on an individual by his or her position in the social hierarchy, Western philosophy tends to define personhood in more abstract terms of the rights accorded to any human being simply by virtue of being human. Kant actually talks a great deal about both duties and rights; but he clearly gives priority in his System to duty. He put himself in the minority among Western philosophers by arguing not only that rights are an epiphenomenon of duty, rather than vice versa, but also that "practical reason" has priority over "theoretical reason". Both of these tendencies appeal to Chinese philosophers, because, quite simply, they are inherently "Chinese" tendencies. Comparisons of Confucian ethics and Kantian ethics have, consequently, served as the springboard for much cross-cultural dialogue, especially from the Chinese side.
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http://books.guardian.co.uk/lrb/articles/0,6109,1076928,00.htmlJonathan Barnes, reviewing The Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece by Geoffrey Lloyd and Nathan Sivin for the Guardian, explains some of the important differences:
First, "compared with their Chinese counterparts, Greek intellectuals were far more often isolated from the seats of political power". Second, in Greece there was a "lack of bureaucratization: there was no institution analogous to the Chinese astronomical bureau". Third, a Greek was not required to produce any "formal qualifications" in order to teach or to practise as a philosopher or scientist or doctor. These three differences had "important repercussions on the nature of the scientific work done in these two societies": not merely on the form which that work took, but also on the substance of the ideas which it promoted.
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ну и на закуску, по поводу языков, интересные мысли:
http://www.hku.hk/philodep/courses/ewmet/Lang.htmlToday, I want to focus on three places where the Chinese background theory of language may be different from the Western theory.One is the assumption about the role of function of language. The second is the phonetic view of meaning and the third is the focus on sentential structure of language.
Western thought typically treats language as representative. That is that the function of language is to describe or provide a word-picture of the world.This probably reflects language structure less than on the conditions under which the culture invented writing—navigation and record keeping vs. oracle bone divination. So metaphysics was the first field of philosophy born in the Mediterranean while China began with an interest in politics. The counterpart assumption in China is that the root function of language is guiding behavior.Both then had derived ways in which the prescriptive and referring functions respectively could be accounted for.
The closest relevant structural features are the doctrine that imperative mood uses an “incomplete” sentence in contrast to Literary Chinese where one can freely omit even descriptive subject terms.It also reflects the requirement that simple descriptive sentences have the important “is” verb while guidance sentences have “should” or “ought.” (Careful! Chinese and Indo-European languages both have both functions in equal degree.We are speaking here of characteristic Wittgensteinian exaggerations in each culture.)
Greek thought grew up after the Phonetic invention of the alphabet had become dominant. This encouraged the view that sounds were the basis of language. If we wonder how words represent things, it is tempting to use the model of picturing. Without a pictographic language, however, the alternative may seem to be mental pictures. So we think of mental images as the unit of meaning and when we associate the right sounds with our images, we understand the language.This is the origin of the notion of a private idea. I will say more about this issue in the next lecture.
There were two kinds of picturing involved in the Western model of language.One is the above picturing that takes place when words refer to objects.The other is the picturing that takes place when a sentence is true.Then the sentence represents objects to be in a certain relation to each other. Thus we think of the contents of mind as being not just ideas but relations of ideas–corresponding to the relations of words in a sentence and to the relations of things in the world.
This gave us a way to understand the important concepts of belief and propositional knowledge. Grammatically both verbs take sentences as objects: “I believe (that) the handover will go smoothly” and “I know (that) Beijing is the capitol of China.”These sentential contents of the mind have been the main targets of epistemological analysis in the West and the attention to them dominates Western philosophy of mind even today. We can link this focus on the sentence to the centrality of debates about “truth” in Western philosophy. Hence, we can tie much of Western philosophy to its view that the representational sentence is key.
In Ancient Chinese, there was no term for belief and知 usually took a noun as object. Translators can easily construct the familiar Western structures from more complex passages using these terms.For example, in Ancient Chinese we can combine the very common instrumental preposition以with the familiar verb 為 in structures that translators render as “believe". Still it involves separating the subject and predicate of the sentence, so we以S 為 P.That structure is mirrored to another in which uses ordinary adjectives or nouns as transitive verbs. We similarly translate these “S white-s X” as S believes that X is white. Clearly these structures will not invite the notion of a sentential mental content as much as the notion of the application of a term, description or predicate to some object in the world.
A cluster of other important features of Chinese help explain the comparative focus on individual characters over sentences.One is the notorious lack of punctuation in Chinese. That, however, is arguably a result of the absence of attention to the sentence more than a cause. One more plausible cause is the absence of inflection–at least absence of sentential role marking inflection (as most inflection is in English).Inflections like -tion, -ize, -s, -ness, -ly, -ity etc. mark the grammatical role of the word in a sentence. These together with the rules of tense, number and other agreement draw attention to the Indo-European sentence structure.
This combines with the relatively strong requirement that “complete sentences express complete thoughts” characteristic of our folk grammar. The sense that a proper unit of language has to have a subject and predicate has informed most of the long tradition of Western philosophy and logic. In Chinese, all pre-verbal terms are optional. This, again, invites a conception of language as putting labels on things. The things we label are in the world. In contrast, the Indo-European picture has both the thing and the predicate in a thought picture with a structure like that of the world consisting of substances and predicates. Thus whole or complete mental states or sentences represent facts–configurations of objects in the world.
For the three institutional differences underlie and account for a general difference in temperament, or at any rate in behaviour, between Chinese and Greeks. This is the difference to which the title of the book alludes: the Chinese were collaborative, the Greeks competitive; in China agreement was sought out or else assumed to exist, in Greece rivalry flourished and was promoted; the Chinese contemplated, the Greeks reasoned. Greek thought is marked by "strident adversariality" and "rationalistic aggressiveness". The turbulent Greeks had to make their way in the "competitive hurly-burly of the Hellenic world", whereas in gentle China an intellectual's concern "was first and foremost persuading a ruler or his surrogates to want their advice". When Chinese meets Chinese, then comes no tug-of-war.
вот интересное продолжение:
http://www.hku.hk/philodep/ch/lang.htm
